PKCE code verifier and challenge
Runs in your browserGenerate a PKCE code_verifier and its S256 code_challenge for OAuth 2.0, or check your own. Plus state and nonce.
- code_challenge (S256)
- state
- nonce
- Authorization URL parameters
Proof that the same app finishes the login
PKCE (RFC 7636, “pixie”) protects the OAuth authorization code flow for apps that can’t keep a client secret: single-page apps, mobile and desktop apps. The app makes a random code_verifier, sends its hash as code_challenge with the login request and later proves it started the flow by sending the verifier with the token request. Someone who steals the code can’t use it without the verifier.
- Authorize:
/authorize?response_type=code&code_challenge=…&code_challenge_method=S256&state=… - Token:
POST /tokenwithgrant_type=authorization_code&code=…&code_verifier=… - The server checks
BASE64URL(SHA256(code_verifier)) == code_challenge.
Make a verifier and challenge
const verifier = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))))
.replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
const hash = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(verifier));
const challenge = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(hash)))
.replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");import crypto from "node:crypto";
const verifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
const challenge = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest("base64url");import secrets, hashlib, base64 verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(32) challenge = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode()).digest()).rstrip(b"=").decode()
VERIFIER=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr '+/' '-_' | tr -d '=') printf '%s' "$VERIFIER" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64 | tr '+/' '-_' | tr -d '='
invalid_grant and friends
The challenge is Base64url without =. One trailing = and the server compares different strings.
The SHA-256 must be Base64url-encoded from the raw 32 bytes, not from the hex string.
With code_challenge_method=plain the challenge is the verifier itself. Use S256 unless the server can’t.
Store the verifier in sessionStorage before redirecting; a new random value after the redirect never matches.
Questions about the PKCE generator
What is a valid code_verifier?
A random string of 43 to 128 characters from A–Z, a–z, 0–9 and - . _ ~ (RFC 7636 §4.1). 32 random bytes in Base64url give exactly 43 characters.
Do I still need state with PKCE?
Yes, state protects against CSRF on your redirect URI and lets you match the response to the request. OpenID Connect adds nonce for the ID token.
Is PKCE only for public clients?
No. The OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice (RFC 9700) and the OAuth 2.1 draft recommend PKCE for all clients, including server-side apps with a client secret.
How do I check a verifier against a challenge?
Paste the verifier into the field above. The tool shows its S256 challenge, which must equal the code_challenge your app sent.